Spontaneous Segregation of Agents Across Double Auction Markets

Aleksandra Aloric, King’s College London

In this research we investigate the possibility of spontaneous segregation of traders into groups when faced with having to choose among several markets. In this talk I will outline the motivation, and introduce the problem. I will present the simplified model we use and results obtained during previous period, where even in the simplest case of two markets and zero intelligence traders, we are able to observe segregation effects below a critical value  of the temperature ; the latter regulates how strongly the traders bias their decisions towards options with large accumulated scores. It is notable that segregation occurs even though the traders are statistically homogeneous. Additionally, I will present an analytical description of the system in the large trader population limit. Predictions from the resulting theory are in good qualitative agreement with simulation results, even though the latter are obtained for relatively small populations of traders.

Location

London Mathematical Laboratory, 14 Buckingham Street, London, WC2N 6DF

Date & Time

Friday 14th March 2014 at 14.00hrs

Registration

LML Seminars are free to attend and no registration is required.